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When ‘nothing happened last time’ becomes a dangerous standard

How everyday shortcuts become accepted practice in correctional facilities — and why the absence of consequences doesn’t mean they’re safe

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In corrections, serious security lapses rarely begin with a deliberate decision to disregard procedures. More often, they develop from small deviations that appear harmless: a security round is delayed, a search is abbreviated, a door is left open for convenience or a count is performed carelessly. Nothing happens, and that is precisely what makes the shortcut dangerous.

Sociologist Diane Vaughan called this phenomenon the normalization of deviance. Her research illustrates how warning signs can gradually become accepted through routine decision-making, organizational culture and past experiences in which deviations produced no apparent consequences. Over time, practices once considered unacceptable begin to seem normal.

Correctional facilities are not NASA, and failures to conduct security rounds or inmate counts do not necessarily produce a national disaster comparable to the Challenger tragedy. Nevertheless, the underlying lesson applies: When deviations from established procedures repeatedly occur without consequences, unacceptable practices can gradually become accepted.

“We just counted them”

I learned this lesson early in my corrections career. As a rookie officer, I was still learning institutional procedures and trying to follow policy.

One night, as we prepared for the 10 p.m. count, a senior officer handed me count slips for the midnight count and said, “You don’t need to do a count again after two hours, because the count was just done.”

Those words carried weight for a rookie officer. Although the midnight count had not been performed, an experienced officer was telling me there was no reason to conduct it. The logic seemed convincing. Only two hours would have passed since the previous count, the prison was calm and we already knew where the inmates were supposed to be.

But a count is not intended to predict whether someone is missing. It is intended to establish precisely who is present at a particular moment. An inmate may have moved, the previous count may have been inaccurate or, worse, an inmate may have attempted or died by suicide during that time.

The purpose of a count is not to produce a completed count slip. It is to ensure accountability.

That experience has stayed with me because it demonstrates how easily shortcuts can be passed from one employee to another until they become the unofficial way of doing business.

How a shortcut becomes culture

Most correctional employees do not arrive at work intending to violate the rules. Deviations often begin under the ordinary pressures of the job: understaffing, emergencies, fatigue, competing responsibilities or simple habit.

An officer might skip a security round because another task seems more urgent. A pat-down might become less thorough because an inmate who has been searched repeatedly has never caused a problem. A secure door might be left open during repeated trips through an area. An inmate movement might be documented later because staff already know where the inmate went.

Initially, these deviations may seem minor. But the greater risk lies in the lesson employees take away when nothing goes wrong.

If the shortcut appears to work, staff may begin questioning whether the original requirement is necessary. Eventually, the exception becomes routine.

A seasoned officer may tell a new employee, “That is how it is stated in the rules, but this is how it works.”

At that point, the shortcut is no longer an isolated decision by one employee. It has become part of the facility’s culture.

Rejecting the normalization of deviance

Vaughan’s research is compelling because it demonstrates how organizations can gradually accept warning signs through everyday practices and decisions.

The lesson for corrections is not that every shortcut will lead to disaster. It is that repeated tolerance of deviations can make unsafe practices seem normal.

Correctional administrators can help prevent this gradual erosion of standards by explaining the purpose behind critical procedures, identifying recurring deviations and addressing unsafe practices before they become routine.

Supervisors should also focus on whether safety procedures are actually being performed, rather than simply whether the required paperwork has been completed. A signed count slip does not establish accountability if the count itself never occurred.

Employees should feel comfortable questioning practices that appear inconsistent with policy, particularly when the justification is that something has always been done a certain way. Near misses should also be incorporated into training so staff can recognize how seemingly minor deviations create opportunities for serious incidents.

Experienced officers have an especially important responsibility. Their behavior influences newly recruited employees, who often look to veteran staff for guidance on how the institution operates.

When an experienced officer treats a shortcut as unimportant, a new officer may interpret that behavior as the accepted standard.

The standard cannot be “Nothing happened last time”

Correctional personnel must recognize and address the normalization of deviance before an accepted shortcut contributes to a serious incident.

The consequences of taking shortcuts in corrections may not be as far-reaching as the Challenger tragedy, but that does not make them any less devastating to the individuals involved.

Skipping a security round could delay the discovery of an inmate experiencing a medical emergency or attempting suicide. An inadequate search could allow contraband into a secure area. Failing to lock a door could create an opportunity for an assault or escape. Skipping inmate counts undermines one of the most fundamental responsibilities of correctional personnel: knowing where the inmates are.

The standard cannot be, “Nothing happened the last time.”

The better question is, “Did we perform the safety function as it was intended?”

Correctional facilities depend on the consistent execution of essential security procedures. Those procedures cannot protect staff and inmates if shortcuts gradually replace them.

The absence of an incident does not mean a shortcut is safe. It may simply mean the consequences have not yet occurred.

Dr. Eliasar Herrera serves as a Contract Oversight Specialist with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, overseeing compliance, contract performance, and community corrections operations. He is also an adjunct criminal justice instructor at Olive-Harvey College and Saint Xavier University. His research interests include prison behavior management, PREA-aligned practices and evidence-based correctional strategies. Dr. Herrera is a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and holds a Doctor of Criminal Justice degree from Pennsylvania Western University. Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the BOP or Department of Justice.