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Appellate court clarifies limits of officer liability in jail medical case

The Eleventh Circuit reinforced that non-medical officers may rely on professional medical judgment absent evidence of subjective recklessness

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Kevil Wingo was arrested in Cobb County Georgia in September 2019 for possession of .2 grams of cocaine and booked into the Cobb County Adult Detention Center (CCADC). A few days later, after complaining of stomach discomfort, he was transferred to the CCADC infirmary. Wingo told the transporting deputy that he had an ulcer. The deputy relayed that information to nursing staff. He was examined at the infirmary by Nurse Burton who was employed by WellStar Health System, Inc.

Wingo complained of nausea, vomiting and abdominal discomfort. Nurse Burton evaluated him and decided that he was detoxing, and in the middle of a 5-day period of drug withdrawal. He was admitted to the infirmary shortly after midnight and scheduled to see a doctor the next morning.

During the night, Wingo loudly and continuously complained about his condition. This upset other inmates and disrupted their sleep. Wingo informed the infirmary duty deputy repeatedly that he needed to go to the hospital. The deputy told him that decisions of that nature were up to infirmary staff. [1]

The following morning, Nurse Visser, the day shift nurse, also concluded that Wingo was detoxing and did not conduct an additional physical assessment. A deputy heard that other inmates were planning to assault Wingo because of his continuous noisy complaints. It was decided to move him for his safety to a bed in the infirmary extension. A deputy went to his cell and watched as he fell to the floor and again asked to go to the hospital.

Major Harris and Lt. Gordon arrived at the infirmary and removed Wingo to the extension. Before doing so, “Major Harris asked Nurse Visser again if it would be medically appropriate to do so. She assured him that it was.” [2] Wingo was unable to walk during transfer and needed a wheelchair. Shortly after 7:45 a.m., Wingo was left in his new cell.

Deputy Wilkerson was required to conduct physical checks on Wingo every 12 minutes; the record reflects those checks were not performed as scheduled. During the first hour that Wingo was in the new cell, Wilkerson and Major Harris checked on him at 8:22 a.m. When Wilkerson checked again at 8:49 a.m., Wingo was unresponsive and in serious trouble. “Shortly thereafter, Wingo was declared dead. An autopsy by the Cobb County Medical Examiner later found that Wingo died from complications of a perforated gastric ulcer with peritonitis.” [3]

The family lawsuit

Wingo’s daughter sued Wellstar, involved nurses and Sheriff’s personnel in federal court. Wellstar and its nurses settled the case and were dismissed from the lawsuit. The sheriff’s deputies remained to defend against allegations that they were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical needs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (federal civil rights statute).

Additionally, Deputy Wilkerson was alleged to be negligent under state law for failing to follow prison rules by regularly checking up on Wingo. “The district court (1) granted summary judgment on the section 1983 claims, concluding the defendants were protected by qualified immunity, and (2) granted summary judgment to Deputy Wilkerson on a state tort claim because [Plaintiff’s expert] Dr. Myers could not say with any degree of medical certainty whether Wingo would have survived if he had been treated differently at 7:45 a.m.” [4] Plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit

The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court pointed out that state prison officials have a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional duty to provide for inmates’ serious medical needs. Failure to do so amounts to “deliberate indifference.” The court instructed that proof of deliberate indifference requires (1) proof of a sufficiently serious injury to an inmate. And (2) proof that the accused officer(s) acted with “subjective recklessness,” i.e. he/she was actually subjectively on notice that his or her action or failure to act could cause a “substantial risk of serious harm” [5] to an inmate.

Applying the established law to the facts, the court noted that the defendant deputies, including the Lieutenant and the Major, were assured by the medical staff that Wingo’s medical issues were related to drug withdrawal (i.e., not an emergency). The court explained that “Our caselaw recognizes that a nonmedical officer cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference if he reasonably relies on the opinion of a medical officer in his treatment of a detainee or inmate.” [6] The court ruled that the deputies were not deliberately indifferent because they relied on professional medical opinion.

Regarding the state law negligence claim against Deputy Wilkerson, the court agreed with the lower court’s determination that plaintiff’s medical experts’ testimony was not sufficient to establish that Wilkerson’s conduct in caring for Wingo caused or contributed to his death. The court reviewed the expert testimony and observed, “When asked about Wingo’s chances of survival when he first came under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch at 7:45 a.m., Dr. Myers admitted that he could not say ‘with any degree of medical certainty’ whether Wingo could have been saved.” [7]

Conclusion

Here detention officers were declared to be free from personal liability after court review. The court held that nonmedical officers who reasonably rely on medical personnel’s professional judgment are not liable for deliberate indifference absent evidence of subjective recklessness.

In these situations, it is critical for deputies to obtain, if possible, a written statement from appropriate medical personnel that contains their medical instructions. If not, it is recommended that deputies write a report that highlights what medical personnel tell them as soon as possible.

Regarding Deputy Wilkerson’s alleged negligence, plaintiff’s expert couldn’t state with certainty that the decedent would have likely survived had Wilkerson followed proper policy requirements. Because the expert could not state with medical certainty that different conduct would have changed the outcome, the court held that causation — a required element of negligence — was not established.

The case underscores the importance of following established procedures and thoroughly documenting medical interactions to reduce exposure to personal liability.

References

1. It was the CCADC policy that deputies were to provide security only and that medical decisions were the responsibility of medical personnel.
2. Wingo v. WellStar Health System, Inc., et al., (No. 24-10933) (11th Cir. 2025).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

John Michael Callahan served in law enforcement for 44 years. His career began as a special agent with NCIS. He became an FBI agent and served in the FBI for 30 years, retiring in the position of supervisory special agent/chief division counsel. He taught criminal law/procedure at the FBI Academy. After the FBI, he served as a Massachusetts Deputy Inspector General and is currently a deputy sheriff for Plymouth County, Massachusetts. He is the author of two published books on deadly force and an upcoming book on supervisory and municipal liability in law enforcement.

Contact Mike Callahan.