By Patrick McCrone
Counter-UAS programs are built to detect and stop drones in the air. Far fewer are designed to safely manage what happens after the aircraft or its payload hits the ground.
For most organizations, the objective is straightforward: detect the drone, track the drone, stop the drone. That is necessary. It is also incomplete.
For many organizations, the most consequential phase of a drone incident begins after the aircraft is on the ground.
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Most counter-UAS planning is still centered on airspace security. The operational challenge often begins when airspace is no longer the primary concern. A drone that has crashed, been abandoned, or completed a payload drop is no longer simply an airspace issue. It is now a safety, response, and investigative problem. That transition is where many organizations are still developing procedures and response capabilities.
A recent incident at Marcy Correctional Facility in New York illustrates the issue clearly. In March, staff detected a drone flying over facility grounds as it dropped a package inside the secure perimeter. Personnel recovered the package and, after noticing wires protruding from it, escalated the situation to a bomb squad response. Once rendered safe, the package was found to contain edged weapons, narcotics, chemically saturated paper, a cell phone, and other contraband. The outcome was positive, due in part to personnel recognizing indicators that warranted escalation and having access to specialized follow-on support.
Had that package been handled differently, or had the hazard indicators been less obvious, the incident could have unfolded very differently. But Marcy was not an outlier. It was one example of a growing and well-documented pattern of drone incursions into correctional facilities in the United States and abroad.
The operational challenge begins after impact
The problem was not detection. Staff saw the drone. The package was recovered, and the drone was later found outside the facility perimeter. The real risk began once personnel had to determine whether either posed an immediate hazard and how to manage both safely. That is not a detection problem. It is a response problem.
A grounded drone may be evidence. It may be carrying contraband. It may contain hazardous materials, an improvised payload, or components intended for surveillance or exploitation. In some environments, it may present an immediate public safety concern. In others, it may mark the beginning of a criminal or national security investigation.
Yet the first person to encounter that aircraft is rarely a specialist.
It is often a patrol officer, corrections officer, security professional, or frontline employee operating within the realities of a fast-moving incident and with varying levels of formal guidance on hazard assessment, scene management, evidence preservation, and follow-on response. In many organizations, the assumption is that once the drone is down, the problem is over. In practice, that is often when the operational response truly begins.
Detection alone is not enough
Across law enforcement, corrections, critical infrastructure, military, aviation, maritime, executive protection and event security environments, significant attention has been placed on drone detection and mitigation. Far less attention has been placed on what happens next.
Organizations have invested heavily in sensors, airspace awareness and defeat capabilities. Far fewer have invested in the procedures, escalation pathways, and training required to safely manage a grounded drone or suspected payload once it is found.
That imbalance is becoming harder to ignore.
UAS detection and defeat technology is often treated as the center of the counter-UAS problem set. It is not. Detection is the opening phase. If an organization can identify a drone but cannot safely assess what it dropped, secure the scene, recognize hazards, preserve evidence and escalate appropriately, it has addressed only the first phase of the incident. Even when a drone is successfully interdicted, the point of landing or impact may still present unknown hazards that must be located, assessed and managed safely.
Grounded drone incidents require practical procedures for safe assessment, hazard recognition, reporting, scene control, escalation, evidence preservation and operational continuity. Those requirements are not theoretical, and they are not one-size-fits-all. The way a corrections officer evaluates a suspected contraband drone differs significantly from how an airport operations team, maritime security unit, or executive protection detail must respond to a suspicious aircraft. Each environment carries its own risks, legal constraints, and operational priorities, meaning personnel must be prepared to make informed decisions within their specific operational context rather than rely on generalized guidance.
What correctional agencies should define now
For correctional agencies, that starts with three practical steps.
First, frontline personnel should be trained to recognize potential hazards associated with grounded drones and suspected payloads. The employees who initially encounter a downed aircraft may not be specialists, but they still need to identify indicators that warrant isolation, caution, and immediate escalation.
Second, agencies need clear escalation protocols that define what happens next. Staff must know who to notify, when to isolate the scene, when to involve supervisory personnel, and when specialized response assets such as a bomb squad, EOD team, or investigative personnel are required.
Third, agencies should define ownership of grounded drone response before an incident occurs. If a drone or payload is found inside a facility perimeter, responsibility for initial assessment, scene control, escalation and coordination with follow-on responders should already be clearly established. In many organizations, those responsibilities are still evolving alongside the threat landscape.
That is why grounded drone response should be treated as a distinct operational discipline rather than an improvised task left to whoever happens to arrive first. Effective response depends on more than awareness. It requires scenario-based decision-making, clear legal authorities, interagency coordination, and practical procedures for safe handling, escalation and evidence preservation.
It requires more than technology. It requires structured, role-specific training, clear procedures and mission-tailored response plans for the environments where these incidents are most likely to occur. Organizations that continue to define counter-UAS solely as a detection and engagement problem are preparing for the first phase of the incident while leaving significant gaps in the ground response phase that often determines the outcome. Without trained personnel capable of executing that response effectively, even the most advanced counter-UAS systems can fall short when it matters most.
About the author
Patrick McCrone is Co-Founder of 38 Sierra and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) professional with more than two decades of experience in counter-IED operations, weapons technical intelligence, and grounded unmanned aircraft system response. He previously served as a technical lead at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) C5ISR Center, where he led work focused on UAS threats, radio-controlled improvised explosive devices, and grounded drone response procedures. He was responsible for developing the initial doctrine for U.S. military EOD response to grounded small unmanned aircraft systems, helping establish formal tactics, techniques and procedures.